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I. INTRODUCTION
This case note addresses the significance of two relatively recent West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals decisions, Aikens v. Debow' and Eastern
Steel Constructors, Inc. v. City of Salem,2 concerning the expansion of tort re-
covery in West Virginia for purely economic losses. 3 In Aikens, the court estab-
1 541 S.E.2d 576 (W. Va. 2000).
2 549 S.E.2d 266 (W. Va. 2001).
3 Purely economic loss is generally "economic harm [that] stands alone, divorced from injury
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lished a new basis regarding potential liability for negligent infliction of purely
economic loss in the form of a "special relationship" analysis.4 In answering a
certified question from the circuit court, the Supreme Court of Appeals held that
a plaintiff may be able to recover purely economic damages, even in the absence
of physical injury to person or property, if the parties had some sort of special
relationship that compels the conclusion that the alleged tortfeasor had a duty to
the particular plaintiff and the injury was clearly foreseeable to the tortfeasor.5
In Eastern Steel, the court applied this special relationship analysis in a
construction industry setting. The plaintiff, a general contractor, brought an
action against Kanakanui Associates, a design professional, and the City of Sa-
lem for economic loss sustained by Eastern allegedly due to errors in the design
plans drafted by Kanakanui, which failed to disclose sub-surface rock and exist-
ing utility lines on the construction site.6 Applying the special relationship
analysis, the court held that a design professional (for example, an architect or
engineer) providing plans to be followed by a contractor, "owes a duty of care to
[the] contractor ... notwithstanding the absence of privity of contract between
the contractor and the design professional due to the special relationship that
exists between the two."'7 As a consequence, "the contractor may, upon proper
proof, recover purely economic damages in an action alleging professional neg-
ligence on the part of the design professional. 8 In other words, if the contractor
suffers economic loss proximately caused by negligent preparation of the design
plans, the architect is potentially liable for the contractor's economic injury.9
This pair of cases indicates that West Virginia has broken away from
the traditional "economic loss rule" that denied any tort recovery in negligence
for claims of purely economic loss, which is generally defined as "economic
harm [that] stands alone, divorced from injury to person or property." 10 In its
place, the court has adopted an analysis primarily based on foreseeability with
an emphasis on the nature of any relationship between the plaintiff and defen-
dant. In Aikens, the court took what Justice Starcher applauded as a "bold step
forward"'" in recognizing that a tortfeasor may owe a "certain, clearly foresee-
to person or property" DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 452 (2000), or "pecuniary loss not
consequent upon injury to [one's] person or property." VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER,
WADE, AND ScHwARTZ's TORTS, CASES AND MATERIALS 435 (10th ed. 2000).
4 541 S.E.2d at 589.
5 Id.
6 E. Steel Constructors, 549 S.E.2d at 269.
7 Id. at 275.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 268, Syl. Pt. 6.
10 DOBBS, supra note 3, § 452; see also FOwLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS §
25.18A (2nd ed. 1986).
11 541 S.E.2d at 592 (Starcher, J., concurring).
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ABANDONING THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE
able party a duty of care to avoid causing 'an interruption in commerce' which
results in purely economic loss.' 12 Eastern Steel represents an example of cir-
cumstances where the special relationship analysis can be applied to permit re-
covery for a purely economic injury. 13
This special relationship analysis is designed to permit recovery for
meritorious claims while still guarding against three traditional fears surround-
ing recovery for negligent infliction of purely economic loss: a limitless expan-
sion of the concept of duty, disproportionate liability, and a flood of litigation.'
4
The analysis also serves two fundamental goals of tort law: compensating vic-
tims of another's carelessness and deterring wrongful conduct.'
5
The bright line distinction drawn by the economic loss rule between re-
covery and non-recovery has now shifted outward to encompass purely eco-
nomic injuries in special situations. Viewed through another lens, the line has
become permeable. It is now capable of allowing meritorious claims to pass
through the barrier while filtering out unworthy ones. However the change is
viewed, West Virginia tort law will impose liability on defendants, under certain
circumstances, for failure to exercise reasonable care to avoid causing purely
economic harm to a certain class of persons.
This change in policy, from a focus on the type of injury involved to the
foreseeability of the particular injury, is appropriate since whether recovery is
permitted in tort law is generally based on the foreseeability of injury, through
the concept of duty, not on whether the injury was physical or purely eco-
nomic. 16 Also, this flexible approach can adequately handle the traditional con-
cerns over recovery of purely economic losses that have justified the application
of the economic loss rule. 17 Although the traditional rule offers ease of applica-
tion by a clearly identifiable bright line, denying recovery for all purely eco-
nomic losses is not justified simply by claims of judicial efficiency and potential
uncertainty. Plaintiffs are just as susceptible to purely economic injuries as they
are to physical ones and requiring a physical impact as a prerequisite to recovery
"capriciously showers compensation along the path of physical destruction, re-
gardless of the status or circumstances of individual claimants."'
' 8
The special relationship analysis recognizes the artificial nature of the
economic loss rule and applies traditional tort principles to permit recovery for
deserving plaintiffs when the circumstances indicate that an injured party was
12 Id.
13 549 S.E.2d at 275.
14 See infra Parts I.A., III.B.
15 See infra Part III.B.3.
16 See Syl. Pt. 3, Sewell v. Gregory, 371 S.E.2d 82, 83 (W. Va. 1988); see also SCHWARTZ ET
AL., supra note 3, at 398.
17 See infra Part III.B.
18 People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 111 (N.J. 1985).
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clearly foreseeable and particularly susceptible to a defendant's careless con-
duct. Although the traditional rule is somewhat arbitrary in its distinction be-
tween physical and purely economic injuries, its main purpose must still be ful-
filled: preventing a limitless expansion of the concept of duty.' 9 This current
expansion must be applied carefully - only in those truly special circumstances.
If this analysis is applied too expansively, the traditional fears surrounding re-
covery of purely economic losses may come to fruition. Thus, the court must
tread lightly into this new realm lest we fall victim to "liability in an indetermi-
nate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class. ' 0
On a more specific note, the application of the special relationship
analysis in the construction industry may have some unique complications.2 1
Providing contractors with a direct cause of action against a designer for negli-
gence, whether in the preparation of plans or supervision of the project, may
interfere with contractual negotiations in the industry.2 2 This could lead to in-
creased construction costs and conflict of interest problems for design profes-
sionals. 23 However, these potential problems, which are not necessary conse-
quences, do not justify allowing designers to act with impunity toward contrac-
tors when performing professional services, especially when contractors are
required to rely upon the quality of the designer's work in estimating costs and
24performing the construction. The special relationship that arises from the
clearly foreseeable consequences of a designer's negligence and the contractor's
required reliance creates a duty on behalf of the designer, separate and distinct
from any contractual obligations, to perform professional services with the ap-
propriate level of skill.25
Part II of this article discusses the history, foundation, and policy behind
the traditional economic loss rule along with a discussion of some recognized
exceptions to the rule. Part III will comment on the court's analysis in both
cases, attempt to define the parameters of this special relationship test, and offer
a few predictions of future sources of special relationships in West Virginia.
Finally, Part IV will focus on the implications of Eastern Steel in particular and
address the concerns over how this change in policy may affect the construction
industry.
19 See infra Part II.A.
20 Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931).




25 E. Steel Constructors, 549 S.E.2d at 275.
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II. No RECOVERY IN NEGLIGENCE FOR PURELY ECONOMIC Loss: THE
TRADITIONAL RULE
When injury results from physical harm to person or property, the gen-
eral rules of negligence apply.26 If a defendant breaches some duty of care,
which proximately causes physical injury to the plaintiff's person or property,
the defendant will be held liable for the injury.27 The existence of a duty on
behalf of a defendant is based on the foreseeability that harm may result if care
is not exercised. 28 If the harm was not foreseeable, then no duty existed. Con-
sequently, if no duty existed, the defendant is not liable for the plaintiffs losses
even if the defendant's conduct fell below a reasonable standard of care.29
However, in the area of recovery for negligently inflicted economic
loss, courts have traditionally drawn a bright line in the sand, beyond which
recovery will not be permitted regardless of the foreseeability of injury.3 ° This
line is generally referred to as the economic loss rule.3 1 The stated rule is sim-
ple: if a plaintiff suffers only purely economic loss, being "economic harm [that]
stands alone, divorced from injury to person or property ' 32 caused by a defen-
dant's negligence, the plaintiff is barred from recovering any damages. Unless
some type of contractual relationship exists that may provide another remedy,
recovery of damages such as lost profits, revenues, opportunities, and so on, will
not be available because tort law has generally not recognized a duty of care to
avoid causing purely economic harm. Negligence liability is generally based
on a duty not to cause physical harm.34 To recover purely economic losses,
some physical impact on the plaintiffs person or property resulting from a de-
fendant's negligence must be shown.35 Without this physical impact, recovery
of the purely economic damages is not permitted. "No action for negligence
will lie without a duty broken"36 and a duty cannot be broken if it does not exist
at the outset.
26 See DOBBS, supra note 3, § 452.
27 See id. § 377.
28 See Syl. Pt. 3, Sewell, 371 S.E.2d at 83; SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 3, at 398.
29 See SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 3, at 398.
30 See Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. MV Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1023 (5th Cir. 1985).
31 See HARPER ET AL., supra note 10, § 25.18A.
32 DOBBS, supra note 3, § 452.
33 See id.
34 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES § 3 (Council Draft
No. 1, 1998).
35 See generally DOBBS, supra note 3, § 452.
36 Aikens, 541 S.E.2d at 580 (quoting Syl. Pt. 1, Parsley v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp.,
280 S.E.2d 703, 704 (W. Va. 1981)).
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An example may make the rule clearer. ABC Retailer37 is having a
weekend holiday sale at its new store. The day before the sale, Jones negli-
gently causes a major accident on Walnut Avenue, the main street leading to the
store. In the course of the accident, major utility lines are damaged causing
Walnut Avenue to be shut down for several weeks during repairs. After the
accident, access to ABC is limited and the store is unable to reap full benefit
from the heavily advertised holiday sale. Additionally, the closed Walnut Ave-
nue, which is the most popular access route to ABC, is unusable to holiday traf-
fic traveling to and from a nearby shopping center for the remainder of the holi-
day season. Although ABC can be reached by other routes, these alternative
routes are less convenient than Walnut Avenue and ABC realizes significantly
less patronage while the street is closed.38
After the accident, ABC suffers a significant loss of patronage and
revenue. The economic loss rule prevents ABC from recovering any damages
from Jones. The injury to ABC is purely economic since ABC was not physi-
cally injured in any way. The law does not impose a duty on behalf of Jones not
to cause economic injury to ABC. Jones only has a duty not to physically dam-
age ABC.3 9 Since there is no duty on behalf of Jones, there is no cause of action
in negligence for ABC to recover its lost revenues. The law simply provides no
remedy for ABC against Jones in this situation.
Changing the facts, let us suppose that Jones negligently crashed his car
directly into the ABC storefront and produced similar damage. In this scenario,
ABC would certainly be permitted to recover for the physical damage to its
building since the law clearly imposes a duty on Jones not to cause physical
harm to ABC.4° Additionally, ABC could recover all lost revenue, including the
lost profits from the holiday sale, proximately caused by the crash since these
damages stem from the physical injury to the building.4' The only difference
between the two scenarios is the physical impact to ABC's property. The physi-
cal impact requirement represents a distinct line marking the point at which the
law will impose a duty of reasonable care. This line demarcates where eco-
nomic damages can be recovered and beyond which no recovery may be had.
This bright line drawn by the economic loss rule has been the traditional
rule in American jurisprudence since the 1927 United States Supreme Court
case Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint.42 In Robins, the plaintiffs had
chartered a ship to transport cargo.43 The defendant dock company had been
37 A fictional company.
38 These facts are similar to those of Aikens, 541 S.E.2d 576.
39 See RESTATEMENT (TmiRD) OF TORTS, supra note 34, §3.
40 See id.
41 See id.
42 275 U.S. 303 (1927).
43 Id. at 307.
[Vol. 105
6
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 105, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 8
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol105/iss1/8
ABANDONING THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE
hired by the ship's owner to perform some repairs to the vessel before the plain-
tiffs gained use of the ship.an While repairing the ship, the defendant negligently
damaged the ship's propeller, which caused the plaintiffs to incur a fourteen-day
delay while the propeller was repaired.45 The plaintiffs subsequently brought a
tort action against the defendant in federal court. The jury returned a verdict in
favor of the plaintiffs in the amount of $32,550.57 plus interest for damages
resulting from the delay, which was upheld by the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals. 46 On a grant of certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the decision.47
Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, denied recovery to the plaintiffs, stat-
ing that "a tort to the person or property of one man does not make the tortfeasor
liable to another merely because the injured person was under a contract with
that other .... The law does not spread its protection so far.' '48 Since the defen-
dant's negligence only resulted in interference with the plaintiffs' charter con-
tract with the ship owner, the plaintiffs had no cause of action against the defen-
dant.49
The actual holding of Robins was not based on an economic loss rule;
rather it was based on an already well-settled principle of English law that de-
nied recovery for negligent interference with contractual rights. 50 Nevertheless,
Robins has since been interpreted to require a physical impact on person or
property as a prerequisite to recovery in negligence of purely economic losses.5'
A. The Policies Behind the Economic Loss Rule
The general policy behind the rule prohibiting recovery of purely eco-
nomic losses is the need to "limit damages to reasonably foreseeable conse-
quences of negligent conduct., 52 Without this limitation, liability would extend
endlessly down the chain of cause and effect. 'There would be no bounds to
actions and litigious intricacies, if the ill effects of the negligences of men could
be followed down the chain of results to the final effect., 53 This foundation of
44 Id.
45 Flint v. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co., 13 F.2d 3, 4 (2nd Cir. 1926).
46 Id.
47 Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co., 275 U.S. at 310.
48 Id. at 309.
49 Id.
50 See Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1023 (5th Cir. 1985).
51 See id. at 1022. For a more detailed discussion of the history and evolution of the "eco-
nomic loss rule" see Herbert Bernstein, Civil Liability for Pure Economic Loss Under American
Tort Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 111 (1998); Eileen Silverstein, On Recovery in Tort for Pure Eco-
nomic Loss, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 403 (1999).
52 People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 110 (N.J. 1985).
53 Aikens v. Debow, 541 S.E.2d 576, 585 (W. Va. 2000) (quoting Kahl v. Love, 37 N.J.L. 5
2002]
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tort law is traditionally addressed through the general principles of foreseeability
and proximate cause analysis, which are fact determinative and are usually ap-
plied on a case-by-case basis.54 However, in the province of purely economic
loss, there has existed a perceived need to artificially restrict the scope of fore-
seeable plaintiffs and proximately caused injuries to those derived from a physi-
cal impact on another's person or property. This apparent need stems from three
basic concerns arising from the general policy prohibiting recovery of purely
economic losses caused by another's negligence: limitless liability, dispropor-
tionate liability, and a proverbial flood of litigation.
1. Limitless Liability
One of the underlying principles used to justify the economic loss rule is
the prevention of limitless liability.55 Since any act can conceivably cause an
indeterminate amount of effects, the physical impact requirement serves to limit
potential liability only to those physically affected. "[O]nly a limited amount of
physical damage can ever ensue from a single act, while the number of eco-
nomic interests a tortfeasor may destroy in a brief moment of carelessness is
practically limitless. 56  Extending liability to the purely economic conse-
quences of minor deviations from the acceptable standard of care could prove
too burdensome for society to handle. Socially useful and productive activities
may be deterred because the risk of liability is so great.57 The law can only ex-
tend its protection so far and the traditional rule provides a bright line that will
easily determine the scope of potential liability.
One example sometimes used to illustrate the potential burden of liabil-
ity is a hypothetical situation where an unlucky motorist causes an accident that
shuts down the New York Battery Tunnel during rush hour, thus delaying thou-
sands of people:
A driver who negligently caused such an accident would cer-
tainly be held accountable to those physically injured in the
crash. But we doubt that damages would be recoverable against
the negligent driver in favor of truckers or contract carriers who
suffered provable losses because of the delay or to the wage
earner who was forced to "clock in" an hour late. And yet it
(1874)).
54 See generally DOBBS, supra note 3, §§ 181, 187.
55 HARPER ET AL., supra note 10, § 25.18B (quoting Comment, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 283, 298
(1953)).
56 Id.
57 See generally Ann O'Brien, Limited Recovery Rule as a Dam: Preventing a Flood of Litiga-
tion for Negligent Infliction of Pure Economic Loss, 31 ARIz. L. REv. 959, 967-68 (1989).
[Vol. 105
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was surely foreseeable that among the many who would be de-
layed would be truckers and wage earners.58
Should the law really hold such an unlucky soul liable for all economic
injuries that would not have occurred but for this unfortunate incident? One can
imagine the thousands of people who would be delayed as a result of the acci-
dent. Should our motorist be held liable for the docked pay of every tardy
worker, additional expenses arising from every delayed shipment, or even far
more significant injuries that could arise through the chain of cause and effect in
our complex commercial world?
The economic loss rule answers these questions in the negative. It cuts
off the endless chain of cause and effect without the arduous task of performing
foreseeability and proximate cause analyses for each and every fact scenario. It
clearly eliminates those plaintiffs who suffered no initial physical injury. With-
out this clear limitation on recovery, decisions as to whether a claim for dam-
ages is "too remote" or "too tenuous" would be made on a case-by-case basis.
There would "be no rationale for the differing results save the 'judgment' of the
trier of fact."59 The imposition of liability in tort could lose any character of
foreseeability and cease to be the result of a predictable rule of law. 60 Potential
defendants could be exposed "to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an
indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.",61 No one would know how far
liability might extend, to what class of plaintiffs, or to what kinds of harm.
By simply requiring a physical impact before a cause of action will even
be entertained, the economic loss rule, in one fell swoop, eliminates a great
number of potential plaintiffs in our tunnel crash scenario. The amorphous line
generated by foreseeability and proximate cause analysis is solidified by the
economic loss rule: no physical impact, no recovery. This reduces the number
of suits that can be brought in the courts and also identifies the potential plain-
tiffs to which the defendant may be held accountable. By confining the scope of
duty to only physical harms, the rule provides a greater degree of predictability.
2. Disproportionate Liability
In a similar vein, permitting recovery for purely economic loss could
also "create a disproportion between the large amount of damages that might be
recovered and the extent of the defendant's fault." 62 The level of negligent con-
58 Kinsman Transit Co. v. City of Buffalo, 388 F.2d 821, 825 n.8 (2d Cir. 1968), quoted in
Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1035 (5th 1985); Silverstein, supra note
51, at 422.
59 Guste, 752 F.2d at 1028.
60 Id.
61 Ultramares v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441,444 (N.Y. 1931).
62 Aikens v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 501 A.2d 277, 279 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
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duct may be slight, but the far-reaching implications may be great. Referring to
the example of the unlucky motorist who crashes in the tunnel, what if the crash
delayed a group of corporate executives on their way to the closing of a multi-
billion dollar trade deal with a foreign nation? The dignitaries become offended
at the tardiness of the executives and view the delay as a dilatory tactic. Prefer-
ring not to do business with a company whose executives cannot attend a meet-
ing on time, the disgusted dignitaries call off the deal and the company loses
millions in potential profits.
It is foreseeable that a crash in a tunnel will delay many motorists on a
busy highway. It is also foreseeable that these motorists will be late for their
appointments or work obligations and this may result in lost wages, discipline,
loss of employment, or worse as in the case of our tardy executives. Even if we
assume the economic loss to the executives was proximately caused by the mo-
torist's negligence, holding the motorist liable for the millions in lost profits of
the corporation seems highly disproportional to the extent of fault. The rule
seeks to prevent situations such as this where, through the chain of cause and
effect, a minor deviation from the reasonable standard of care causes harm re-
sulting in the imposition of crushing liability clearly disproportional to the cul-
pability of the defendant. Again, the economic loss rule provides a clear limit
beyond which the law will not provide a remedy by restricting the duty of due
care to avoid causing only physical harm.63
3. A Flood of Litigation
A third concern behind the economic loss rule is the prevention of the
proverbial flood of litigation that may ensue if purely economic losses could be
recovered in a negligence suit. Allowing such a cause of action could not only
lead to administrative overload for the court system, but it could also saddle the
public with a "crushing burden of litigation. ' '64 Referring to our tunnel crash
example, every person delayed by the accident would have a potential cause of
action for economic damages whether it be for lost wages, increased transporta-
tion expenses, or any other possible delay damages. If recovery against the
driver is permitted for the commercial carrier who incurs lost profits because of
late deliveries, then can the manufacturer that expected the on-time shipment
recover for any damages it may sustain? What about distributors of the manu-
facturer that expected the product to be available? What about the retailers, the
consumers? The number of potential plaintiffs could climb into the thousands.
Limiting the pool of potential plaintiffs to only those physically impacted elimi-
nates this potential flood of claims for economic loss.
63 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 34, §3.
64 Aikens v. Debow, 541 S.E.2d 576, 586 (W. Va. 2000) (quoting Dundee Cement Co. v.
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Serving these concerns, the economic loss rule has stood as a traditional
bulwark against the fear of an explosion in tort liability. It has provided a clear
and easy-to-apply standard for how far, or over what interests, the law will
spread its protection. The location of this bright line is ultimately a matter of
public policy, 65 which has for the most part disapproved of tort liability for
purely economic losses. 66 However, even though the economic loss rule is in-
tended to serve as a distinct limit beyond which the law will not allow recovery
of damages, some exceptions to the rule have developed over the years to allow
recovery for purely economic losses to special classes of plaintiffs in special
situations.
B. Exceptions to the Rule
One widely noted exception to the economic loss rule covers damages
suffered by a plaintiff whose business is based, at least partly, on the use of
maritime resources. If a defendant negligently causes harm to a maritime re-
source, usually by pollution of the water, some courts have allowed recovery for
purely economic damages to a limited class of plaintiffs such as commercial
anglers.67 For example, in Union Oil Co. v. Oppen,68 the defendant oil company
negligently released large amounts of crude oil into the Pacific Ocean while
performing drilling operations off the coast of California.69 The wind and ocean
currents carried the oil spill over a large surface area of the water and also onto
the coastline. 70 The pollution resulted in damage to the aquatic resources and a
loss of profits to the commercial anglers in the area.7'
Imposing liability on the defendants, Oppen concluded that the deadly
effects of pollution on aquatic life and the resulting adverse impact on commer-
cial fishing were clearly foreseeable: "[t]o assert that the defendants were unable
to foresee that negligent conduct resulting in a substantial oil spill could dimin-
ish aquatic life and thus injure the plaintiffs is to suppose a degree of general
65 Aikens, 541 S.E.2d at 592.
66 See DOBBS, supra note 3, § 452.
67 See generally Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. MV Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th 1985) (en banc)
(holding defendants liable to all commercial fishermen, shrimpers, crabbers and oystermen for
causing pollution of Mississippi River); Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974);
Masonite Corp. v. Steede, 23 So. 2d 756 (Miss. 1945) (en banc) (allowing operator of fishing
resort to recover lost profits due to pollution); Columbia River Fishermen's Protective Union v.
City of St. Helens, 87 P.2d 195 (Or. 1939) (same as Union Oil Co.). See also Burgess v. MV
Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247 (D. Me. 1973) (allowing commercial fisherman to recover lost profits,
on a nuisance theory, caused by an oil spill).
68 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974).
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ignorance of the effects of oil pollution not in accord with good sense. 72 Since
the potential harm was so clearly foreseeable if the defendants did not exercise
reasonable care, the court held "that the defendants are under a duty to commer-
cial fishermen to conduct their drilling and production in a reasonably prudent
manner so as to avoid the negligent diminution of aquatic life ....
Commercial anglers are not the only class of deserving plaintiffs. Courts
have allowed recovery of pecuniary losses when a defendant's negligence re-
sults in damage or diminution in the value of riparian property. 74 Recovery of
lost wages has also been permitted for crewmembers of a fishing boat who lost
their share of the catch when the ship was damaged by a defendant's negligent
conduct.75
The common idea shared by these cases is the particular foreseeability
of the plaintiffs:
The theory running throughout these cases, in which the plain-
tiffs depend on the exercise of the public or riparian right to
clean water as a natural resource, is that the pecuniary losses
suffered by those who make direct use of the resource are par-
ticularly foreseeable because they are so closely linked, through
the resource, to the defendants' behavior.76
Courts have recognized that these particular plaintiffs suffered damages greater
in degree than the general public. 77 In regard to the commercial anglers, the
pollution had interfered with the public right to fish which was a "special inter-
est quite apart from that of the general public. 78 By elevating the plaintiffs'
interest above that of a common interest in a public resource to the level of a
special interest, courts have expanded the concept of duty on behalf of defen-
dants to include that class of plaintiffs who are directly impacted by damage to
marine resources.79 Since these defendants owe a duty to the potential plaintiffs
72 Id. at 569.
73 Id. at 570.
74 See, e.g., Hampton v. North Carolina Pulp Co., 27 S.E.2d 538 (N.C. 1943) (holding polluter
liable for economic losses of downstream riparian landowners); cf. Birchwood Lakes Colony Club
v. Borough of Medford Lakes, 449 A.2d 472 (N.J. 1982) (allowing residents whose use of lake-
side properties were diminished by pollution from defendant's sewage treatment plant to sue for
compensatory damages on nuisance theory).
75 See Miller Indus. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 733 F.2d 813, 818-20 (1 1th Cir. 1984); Carbone
v. Urisch, 209 F.2d 178, 181-82 (9th Cir. 1953).
76 People Express Airlines v. Consol. Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 114 (N.J. 1985).
77 See Burgess v. MN Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247,250 (D. Me. 1973).
78 Id. at 250 (emphasis added).
79 See Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 559 (9th Cir. 1974).
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not to interfere with the natural resources, tort law can grant recovery if the
plaintiff's loss, even a purely economic loss, was proximately caused by a
breach of that duty of care.8°
Apart from the well-recognized maritime exception, various courts have
also acknowledged a smattering of other exceptions to the rule when the plain-
tiff and defendant shared some sort of special relationship. Although the parties
shared no direct relationship, such as by contract, liability has been imposed on
"defendants who, by virtue of their special activities, professional training, or
other unique preparation for their work, had particular knowledge or reason to
know that others.., would be economically harmed by negligent conduct.",
81
When the parties share a special relationship, the general duty of care is ex-
panded to include reasonable care to avoid causing purely economic injury.82
This situation can arise when a clearly foreseeable plaintiff relies on the quality
of a defendant's professional services, and the plaintiff suffers an injury proxi-
mately caused by the defendant's negligence. 83 It is important to re-emphasize
that these cases do not involve any breach of contract claim,84 rather, "they in-
volve tort claims by innocent third parties who suffered purely economic losses
at the hands of negligent defendants with whom no direct relationship ex-
isted.,
85
For example, accountants have been held liable to third parties for the..... .86
negligent preparation of financial reports in the absence of privity of contract.
Surveyors 87 and termite inspectors88 have been held liable to remote purchasers
of homes for negligent performance of professional services. Attorneys89 and
notaries public9° have also been subject to liability when their negligence
proximately caused an intended beneficiary of a will to be deprived of its pro-
80 See id.
81 People Express Airlines v. Consol. Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 113 (N.J. 1985).
82 See Aikens v. Debow, 541 S.E.2d 576 (W. Va. 2000); People Express Airlines, 495 A.2d at
107; DOBBS, supra note 3, § 452.
83 People Express Airlines, Inc., 495 A.2d at 112.
84 Damages for breach of contract are always purely economic. The purpose of breach of
contract damages is to compensate the injured party for its monetary loss from reliance on the
breaching party or loss of expected benefit under the contract. See generally MARVIN A.
CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 147-79 (1998).
85 People Express Airlines, Inc., 495 A.2d at 112 (emphasis added).
86 See H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983); First Nat]. Bank v. Crawford,
386 S.E.2d 310 (W. Va. 1989).
87 See Rozny v. Marmul, 250 N.E.2d 656 (Ill. 1969).
88 See Hardy v. Carmichael, 24 Cal. Rptr. 475 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962).
89 See Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961).
90 See Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958); Galloway v. Cinello, 423 S.E.2d 875 (W.
Va. 1992) (citing W.Va. Code § 29C-6-101 (1999)).
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ceeds. Contractors performing work on a building have been impressed with a
duty to tenants to complete construction in a timely manner to avoid economic
injury to the tenants.9' Also, as we shall see in Eastern Steel, design profession-
als such as architects and engineers have been held responsible to non-privity
contractors for economic damages caused by the designer's negligence in super-
vising the project or preparing the design specifications.
92
In each of these cases, the defendant possessed some special knowledge
and was clearly aware of the particular plaintiff and possible consequences she
may suffer if the defendant were negligent. Economic injury in these situations
was foreseeable in the sense that the defendants had reason to know the particu-
lar consequences of their negligent conduct and specifically who may suffer as a
result. Thus, the courts expanded the duty of reasonable care to include a lim-
ited scope of purely economic injuries.
These exceptions to the traditional rule have only been made in limited
circumstances. When liability has been imposed, it has been because of the
special situation in which the plaintiff and defendant found themselves. Apart
from these special situations, the traditional rule has still persisted to deny re-
covery for purely economic injuries. However, a handful of jurisdictions, which
now includes West Virginia, have overtly discarded the traditional rule. Instead
of continuing to devise exceptions to the rule, these jurisdictions have chosen to
adopt a special relationship analysis in its place.93 As discussed above, this
analysis is primarily anchored by foreseeability with an emphasis on the nature
of any relationship between the parties. The next section comments on the two
West Virginia decisions in which the court adopts and then applies the special
relationship analysis to cases involving negligent infliction of economic loss.
Along with a discussion of the court's analysis, the next section will attempt to
define the parameters of the special relationship analysis and offer some forecast
into future sources of other special relationships in West Virginia.
91 See J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60 (Cal. 1979).
92 See Donnelly Constr. Co. v. Oberg/Hunt/Gilleland, 677 P.2d 1292 (Ariz. 1984); Tommy L.
Griffin Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Jordon, Jones, & Goulding, Inc., 463 S.E.2d 85 (S.C. 1995)
(see note I for a list of jurisdictions imposing liability); E. Steel Constructors v. City of Salem,
549 S.E.2d 266 (W. Va. 2001). But see Blake Constr. Co., Inc. v. Alley, 353 S.E.2d 724 (Va.
1987) (refusing to impose liability on architect for economic damages suffered by contractor
caused by negligent preparation of design plans).
93 See generally Mattingly v. Sheldon Jackson Coll., 743 P.2d 356 (Alaska 1987); J'Aire
Corp., 598 P.2d 60; Hawthorne v. Kober Constr. Co., 640 P.2d 467 (Mont. 1982); People Express
Airlines v. Consol. Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107 (N.J. 1985).
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III. AIKENS AND EASTERN STEEL
A. Aikens: Establishing the Special Relationship Analysis
In Aikens v. Debow,94 the court set the stage for the expansion of tort li-
ability in West Virginia by adopting the special relationship analysis for recov-
ery of purely economic losses.9 Aikens involved a motel owner who was seek-
ing to recover lost profits from a truck operator who crashed into an interstate
overpass. 96 The facts were as follows: while the defendant was transporting a
large piece of earth moving machinery on Interstate 8 1, the machine proved too
tall to fit under an interstate overpass. The collision caused substantial damage
to the bridge and it was closed for nineteen days. 98 The plaintiff claimed that his
motel suffered decreased revenues during this period. 99 The crash did not
physically harm the motel in any way, nor did the plaintiff have any property
interest in the damaged interstate bridge.'0 ° The plaintiff simply claimed that
the overpass closure, which prevented convenient access to the motel for poten-
tial patrons, was the cause of the decreased revenue.' ' Although the motel
could still be accessed by other routes, the overpass provided the shortest, most
convenient access to the motel for south-bound travelers on Interstate 81.12
Since the defendants' negligence caused the bridge to be closed, the plaintiff
alleged that the defendants proximately caused the decrease in revenue.10
After the defendants' motion for summary judgment was denied, the
parties agreed to certification of the issue regarding liability in West Virginia for
economic loss in the absence of physical damage to person or property. The
Circuit Court of Berkeley County certified the following issue and answered it
in the affirmative:
Whether a claimant who has sustained no physical damage to
his person or property may maintain an action against another
94 541 S.E.2d 576 (W. Va. 2000).
95 Id. at 579, Syl. Pt. 9.
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for negligent injury to another's property which results conse-
quentially in purely economic loss to the claimant. 14
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals chose not to address this
specific certified question. 105 Apparently believing the question did not properly
frame the legal issue, possibly being too narrow in scope, 1°6 the court reformu-
lated the question to the following:
May a claimant who has sustained purely economic loss as a re-
sult of an interruption in commerce caused by negligent injury
to the property of a third person recover damages absent either
privity of contract or some other special relationship with the
alleged tortfeasor?
10 7
This question was answered in the negative early in the opinion.1
08
However, this answer did not indicate a refusal to impose liability for purely
economic loss in West Virginia. On the contrary, this opinion actually laid the
foundation for the court to extend liability for purely economic losses in certain
circumstances. 109 The reformulation of the certified question seems to hint at
the direction the court was willing to take with regard to the economic loss rule.
In the original question, there was no mention of privity of contract or special
relationship. 10 In addition, the court redefined the damages issue to include
"purely economic loss" that results from an "interruption in commerce." '' Also
properly reflecting the fact pattern at hand, the question was addressed to dam-
ages caused by negligent injury to the property of a third person.11 2 While ap-
parently denying recovery to this plaintiff,1 3 the court seized the opportunity to
outline the newly expanded scope of recovery for purely economic losses in
West Virginia.
104 Aikens v. Debow, 541 S.E.2d 576, 579-80 (W. Va. 2000).
105 Id. at 580.
i16 Id. ("[W]e reframe the question presented in the case sub judice to more thoroughly encom-
pass the full breadth of the question to be answered.")
107 Id. (emphasis added).
108 Id.
109 See id. at 579, Syl. Pt. 9 (indicating that if a special relationship exists between the parties,
recovery of purely economic losses may be permitted).
110 Id. at 579-80.
III Id. at 580.
112 Id.
113 See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
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The court began its analysis with a discussion of basic tort law and the
existence of a duty as a fundamental prerequisite for the imposition of liabil-
ity. 11 4 The existence of duty, or more particularly the non-existence of a duty,
has been the traditional barrier against claims for purely economic loss. As dis-
cussed above, the economic loss rule simply refused to find that a defendant
breached any duty to a plaintiff in cases of purely economic loss. 115 Thus, the
determination that a duty existed on behalf of a defendant to avoid causing eco-
nomic injury to a particular plaintiff is a precondition for recovery. "No action
for negligence will lie without a duty broken."
' 16
The court also clearly stated that the issue of whether a defendant in a
particular case owes a duty to a plaintiff is not a question to be resolved by the
jury. The determination of this issue "must be rendered by the court as a matter
of law."' 17 Thus, before a plaintiff can assert a negligence claim against a de-
fendant for economic injury, the court must first conclude, as a matter of law,
that the defendant owed a duty of care to the particular plaintiff.
Next, the court progressed to the question of how this determination of
duty is to be made. In accordance with traditional tort principles, the court em-
phasized that "foreseeability of risk is a primary consideration" in determining
the existence and scope of a duty one may owe to another.' 18 Foreseeability,
however, is not the only consideration. Finding the existence of a duty is also
an issue of public policy.1 19 How far should the scope of the legal system's pro-
tection extend? At what point does the law cease to provide a remedy? Where
is the line beyond which recovery cannot be granted by a court of law?
In addressing this public policy issue, Aikens appears to deny recovery
to the motel operator, 12 but at the same time expands the traditional scope of
duty into the realm of pure economic loss under the special relationship analy-
sis. The court apparently concluded that the traditional line represented by the
economic loss rule should be pushed outward to allow recovery under limited
circumstances. However, the line may not have moved at all; it may simply
have become more fluid, more flexible - no longer an ironclad rule. The con-
cept is stated as follows:
[A]n individual who sustains purely economic loss from an in-
terruption in commerce caused by another's negligence may not
114 Aikens, 541 S.E.2d at 580 (quoting Syl. Pt. 1, Parsley v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,
280 S.E.2d 703, 704 (W. Va. 1981)).
15 See DOBBS, supra note 3, § 452.
116 Aikens, 541 S.E.2d at 580 (quoting Syl. Pt. 1, Parsley, 280 S.E.2d at 704).
117 Id. at 581.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 583 (citing Harris v. R.A. Martin, Inc., 513 S.E.2d 170, 176 (W. Va. 1998) (Maynard,
J., dissenting)).
120 The certified question, addressing the facts of Aikens, was answered in the negative.
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recover damages in the absence of physical harm to that indi-
vidual's person or property, a contractual relationship with the
alleged tortfeasor, or some other special relationship between
the alleged tortfeasor and the individual who sustains purely
economic damages sufficient to compel the conclusion that the
tortfeasor had a duty to the particular plaintiff and that the in-
jury complained of was clearly foreseeable to the tortfeasor.''
In short, to maintain an action for purely economic damages, the court must first
determine that the defendant owed a duty to the particular plaintiff, by virtue of
a contract or some special relationship.1 22 Also, the plaintiffs injury must have
been clearly foreseeable to the defendant.1
23
Of course this begs the question: when does a special relationship exist?
The court suggested that this "will be determined largely by the extent to which
the particular plaintiff is affected differently from society in general."'' 24 The
court elaborated on the existence of a special relationship:
[I]t may be evident from the defendant's knowledge or specific
reason to know of the potential consequences of the wrongdo-
ing, the persons likely to be injured, and the damages likely to
be suffered. Such special relationship may be proven through
evidence of foreseeability of the nature of the harm to be suf-
fered by the particular plaintiff or an identifiable class and can
arise from contractual privity or other close nexus.1
2 5
Is the plaintiff in a special situation that justifies imposing liability?
Should the defendant have known that its carelessness would clearly cause in-
jury to a particular person? Was the plaintiff particularly susceptible to injury
by the defendant? If these questions are answered in the affirmative, it appears
West Virginia tort law will impose a duty of care to avoid causing economic
injury to a particular plaintiff and consequently permit recovery for this injury if
proximately caused by the defendant's negligence.
On its face, the special relationship analysis appears to be no more than
traditional foreseeability analysis in basic tort law. The key difference is that
the plaintiff must be particularly foreseeable - of a particularly identifiable
class.' 26 The potential tortfeasor must have knowledge of the probable conse-
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quences of its carelessness - the particular damage that could be inflicted.
127
This emphasis on particularity is an apparent attempt to confine the scope of
recovery for economic loss to specifically identifiable plaintiffs, and to prevent
liability from extending out to all that might, in a general sense, be foreseeably
injured.
But how is a particular class of plaintiffs to be identified? The court
provided the vague guidelines quoted above and noted that "[a]ny attempt.., to
more specifically define the parameters of circumstances which may be held to
establish a 'special relationship' would create more confusion than clarity.'
28
Thus we have a flexible, elastic approach to recovery of purely economic losses.
The scope of the general duty of care now depends on the circumstances sur-
rounding the injury. The key question is whether the plaintiff and the injury
were particularly foreseeable, rather than the traditional approach which first
asked whether the plaintiff had been physically damaged in any way.'
29
The court adopted this special relationship analysis, dubbing it a "hybrid
approach" to the recovery of purely economic losses.' 30 It is designed to "au-
thorize recovery of meritorious claims while simultaneously providing a barrier
against limitless liability.' 3' It is intended to satisfy the historical concern re-
garding the potential for limitless expansion of duty while still providing recov-
ery for deserving plaintiffs. Allowing recovery for economic losses only upon
a showing of a special relationship "narrowly tailors the recovery"'' 32 to prevent
the feared limitless expansion of duty.
Aikens acknowledged that a line must be drawn beyond which the law
will not offer a remedy, but noted that the location of this line is "ultimately a
matter of 'practical politics.""133 "Tort law is essentially a recognition of limita-
tions expressing finite boundaries of recovery."'134 The drawing of this line "is
not a matter of protection of a certain class of defendants; nor is it a matter of
championing the causes of a certain class of plaintiffs. It is a question of public
policy.' '135 This issue of public policy is the extent to which the courts should
recognize an injury, being physical, economic, or otherwise, as one entitling the
127 Aikens v. Debow, 541 S.E.2d 576, 589 (W. Va. 2000).
128 Id. at 590.
129 See supra Part H.
130 Aikens, 541 S.E.2d at 590.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 591 (quoting Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (An-
drews, J., dissenting)).
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injured party to a legal remedy, usually monetary damages. 36 The court ulti-
mately concluded that a purely economic injury will only be entitled to a judi-
cial remedy when this amorphous special relationship exists between the plain-
tiff and defendant.
37
Before dispatch, the court recognized the utility of the traditional rule; it
provides an easily identifiable bright line beyond which recovery will not be
permitted. 38 It also recognized the concern over the "limitless expansion of
duty" that the traditional rule is designed to prevent. 39 However, it noted that
an inability to design a standard for recovery to fit the "differing facts of future
cases simply does not justify the wholesale rejection of recovery in all cases."'
140
The special relationship analysis will allow recovery of economic losses for
meritorious claims while still guarding against the potential expansion of tort
liability to a limitless degree by adjusting the location of the line between recov-
ery and non-recovery.
Viewed from another perspective, the line may not have moved at all.
Rather, it has become fuzzier than the traditional bright line. It is no longer a
fortress wall protecting defendants from an onslaught of plaintiffs armed with
claims of economic losses. Nor is it any longer an insurmountable barrier that
cannot be breached by plaintiffs seeking recovery for injuries clearly caused by
the wrongful conduct of another. The line has become fluid, more flexible - no
longer a hard and fast rule. It is now permeable, if you will. It is structured to
allow only the meritorious claims to pass through while filtering out the unwor-
thy ones, allowing liability for economic losses to attach only in those special
circumstances. However one chooses to conceptualize the analytical shift, the
concept of duty in West Virginia tort law has changed to encompass negligently
inflicted economic losses in special situations.
The court has apparently concluded that public policy will be better
served by replacing the traditional barrier to recovery with a more flexible ap-
proach. 141  In balancing the merits of allowing recovery for purely economic
losses against the potential burden of litigation, the court determined that recov-
ery for purely economic losses could be permitted without subjecting society to
"liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indetermi-
nate class."'
142
136 See DOBBS, supra note 3, § 377.
137 Aikens, 541 S.E.2d at 589.
138 See id. at 581-83.
139 See id.
140 Id. at 595 (Starcher, J., concurring) (quoting People Express Airlines v. Consol. Rail Corp.,
495 A.2d 107, 111 (N.J. 1985)).
141 See generally id.
142 Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441,444 (N.Y. 1931).
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As discussed earlier, the concern over a possible explosion of liability
has served as the fundamental justification for denying recovery for negligently
inflicted economic IOSS. 14 3 However, this rationale "supports only a limitation
on, not a denial of, liability."'" Innocent victims of another's carelessness are
just as susceptible to purely economic injury as they are to physical injury, but
the requirement of a physical impact "capriciously showers compensation along
the path of physical destruction, regardless of the status or circumstances of
individual claimants."1 45 "The asserted inability to fix chrystalline formulae for
recovery on the differing facts of future cases simply does not justify the whole-
sale rejection of recovery in all cases.' 46 Requiring plaintiffs to first meet the
special relationship requirement should prevent the feared explosion of liability
by restricting claims of economic loss to only special situations.
B. Dealing with the Traditional Fears
By confining liability to a particularly foreseeable class of plaintiffs,
this prerequisite of a special relationship addresses the three concerns for allow-
ing recovery for purely economic loss.
1. Limitless Liability
First, allowing recovery only under special circumstances will not ex-
pose a defendant to limitless liability. Rather, it will be confined to particularly
foreseeable economic injuries sustained by a particularly foreseeable class. De-
fendants will not be liable for all possible consequences of their negligence, but
only for the "natural and probable consequences"'' 47 of their negligent acts
which harm particularly foreseeable plaintiffs. Liability is limited only to those
within the close nexus that defines the parameters of the special relationship. 48
It will not extend beyond this special class of plaintiffs and, additionally, recov-
ery is permitted only for a particularly foreseeable type of injury. Thus, the end-
less chain of cause and effect is cut off at the close nexus. As discussed above,
there is still a line beyond which recovery will not be permitted; it has only
shifted, or become less bright.
143 See supra Part II.A.




147 Aikens, 541 S.E.2d at 584 (citing Rickards v. Sun Oil Co., 41 A.2d 267, 269 (N.J. Sup.
1945)).
148 See id. at 589.
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2. Disproportionate Liability
Next, allowing recovery under the limited terms of a special relationship
should not expose defendants to any more disproportionate liability than possi-
ble under traditional tort law. A brief moment of carelessness on the highway
could lead to a multi-vehicle calamity causing massive and extensive physical
damage to both persons and property. Even though the level of negligence may
be slight, the results are disastrous. Nevertheless, the party at fault will be liable
for all proximately caused physical damage and consequential economic harms,
which may be greatly disproportional to the culpability of the negligent party.
In light of the multi-billion dollar payouts in lawsuits over asbestos, Benedectin,
silicone breast implants, and other mass torts, 14 9 liability for a limited scope of
purely economic losses seems no more disproportional. Recovery under the
special relationship analysis is also limited to clearly foreseeable injuries, which
further restricts the scope of potential liability. Furthermore, economic injuries
are provable and can be calculated with a reasonable amount of certainty. 5 '
They are not subjective or speculative like monetary damages for pain and suf-
fering and other physical injuries. 15' The distinction between physical and
purely economic injuries is an inadequate solution to the problem of dispropor-
tionate liability, and recovery under the special relationship analysis will not
likely aggravate the problem.
3. A Flood of Litigation
Finally, restricting recovery of economic losses to a limited, particularly
foreseeable class of plaintiffs also prevents the potential flood of litigation by
continuing to eliminate all remotely injured parties from the sphere of a defen-
dant's duty. Only the limited class of plaintiffs existing within the nexus re-
quirement, those special plaintiffs, would be entitled to seek recovery. Since the
pool of potential plaintiffs has only expanded to include a limited class, the cor-
responding amount of potential litigation should likewise be only limited.
By opening the door to a new class of plaintiffs, the number of claims
for economic loss is likely to rise as more litigants claim entitlement to recovery
under the special relationship analysis. Accordingly, the number of cases ap-
pearing on the docket may increase. However, the special relationship analysis
enables the courts to dismiss undeserving claims early in the litigation since the
existence of a special relationship is a question of law: whether the defendant
149 See generally Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Symposium: Reinventing Civil
Litigation: Evaluating Proposals for Change: Understanding Mass Personal Injury Litigation: A
Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961 (1993) (cited in Silverstein, supra note 51, at 423).
150 See generally Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Public Policy: Valuing Life and Limb in Tort:
Scheduling "Pain and Suffering," 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 908 (1989) (cited in Silverstein, supra note
51, at 423).
151 See generally id.
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owed a duty to the plaintiff. 152 If the court determines that the defendant did not
owe a duty to the plaintiff, then the plaintiff cannot recover, as a matter of law,
and summary judgment is appropriate. 53 Any potential increase in tort litiga-
tion should not be so great as to cause administrative overload in the judicial
system.
54
In addition to addressing the traditional concerns, further support for al-
lowing recovery of purely economic losses can be found in the goals of modern
tort law. First, one goal of tort law is to compensate those victims who have
been injured by the wrongful conduct of another. 155 A party responsible for
another's injury should shoulder the burden of restoring the injured party to its
original condition. 56 Since the concept of duty in tort law is designed to impose
liability only for the foreseeable consequences of negligent conduct,151 whether
those consequences are physical or purely economic injury is irrelevant to the
question of foreseeability.
Second, another fundamental policy of tort law, and law in its broadest
purpose, is to deter wrongful conduct.1 58 "Imposing liability on defendants for
their negligent conduct discourages others from similar tortious behavior."'
15 9
Allowing recovery for purely economic losses in limited circumstances thus
encourages socially responsible behavior. Although one may speculate as to
how the law can effectively deter an unintentional act, the narrow scope of the
special relationship analysis applies only to limited scenarios. It encourages
parties who work closely with one another, who rely on one another to perform
certain tasks properly, to be cognizant of the possible harm that could result
from careless conduct. The potential for liability encourages parties to exercise
the appropriate level of skill to prevent economic harm to those vulnerable to
152 Syl. Pt. 5, Aikens, 541 S.E.2d at 578.
153 See Syl. Pt. 3, Atkinson v. Harmon, 158 S.E.2d 169, 171 (W. Va. 1967) ("Liability of a
person for injury to another cannot be predicated on negligence unless there has been on the part
of the person sought to be charged some omission or act of commission in breach of duty to the
person injured.") (quoting Syl. Pt. 6, Morrison v. Roush, 158 S.E. 514, 515 (W. Va. 1931)); Syl.
Pt. 1, Davis v. Cross, 164 S.E.2d 899, 900 (W. Va. 1968) ("[I]f the plaintiff fails to establish such
primary negligence the court should direct a verdict for the defendant.").
154 As evidenced by Aikens, the economic loss rule does not prevent a plaintiff from hauling a
defendant into court. It only prevents recovery by declaring, as a matter of law, that the defendant
did not owe a duty of care to prevent purely economic losses to the plaintiff. Frivolous lawsuits
can always be filed, thereby forcing a defendant to spend money to defend the claim. The eco-
nomic loss rule and the special relationship only prevent such suits from progressing to trial.
155 See People Express Airlines v. Consol Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 111 (N.J. 1985); see also
SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 3, at 1.
156 See People Express Airlines, 495 A.2d at 11; see also SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 3, at 1.
157 See DOBaS, supra note 3, § 452.
158 See People Express Airlines, 495 A.2d at 111; see also SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 3, at 1.
159 See People Express Airlines, 495 A.2d at 111.
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injury. In other words, it deters careless conduct by imposing a punishment
where one did not exist before.
By adjusting the location of the line beyond which recovery will not be
granted, or replacing a solid wall with a chain link fence, West Virginia has ex-
panded the bounds of the concept of duty to encompass only special cases of
economic loss while simultaneously guarding against the traditional fears sur-
rounding tort recovery for purely economic loss and also serving two fundamen-
tal goals of tort law.
Applying the special relationship model to the facts of Aikens, it appears
that the parties did not have any type of relationship whatsoever, be it contrac-
tual or special. These defendants did not have any knowledge or specific reason
to know that their negligence would cause economic harm to this particular
plaintiff. Therefore, in the absence of any close nexus between the parties, it
appears the defendants did not have a duty to the plaintiff to avoid causing eco-
nomic harm. In the absence of a duty broken, no action for negligence will
lie.160 Thus, Mr. Aikens could not seek retribution from these defendants. In
this case, the protection of the law did not spread so far.
Although the facts of Aikens do not appear to justify recovery, Aikens
established the special relationship analysis and opened the door for the right
case to come to the docket where recovery of economic loss would be permitted
in West Virginia - a case where this special relationship exists and the plaintiff
would be clearly foreseeable to the defendant.
Interestingly, the right case was apparently already on the court's calen-
dar.16 ' Now that the analytical framework had been erected, the court was ready
to provide its first example of when a special relationship does exist, and how
the new analysis can be applied to expand the concept of duty in West Virginia
into the realm of purely economic injury.
C. Eastern Steel: The Court Finds a Special Relationship
In Eastern Steel Constructors, Inc. v. The City of Salem,162 the plaintiff,
a general contractor, brought suit to recover damages for lost profits allegedly
due to defective plans and specifications prepared by one of the defendants,
Kanakanui Associates, a design professional. 163 The facts were as follows:
Kanakanui was under contract with the City of Salem to provide engineering
and architectural services for certain improvements to Salem's existing sewer
160 Aikens v. Debow, 541 S.E.2d 576, 580 (quoting Syl. Pt. 1, Parsley v. General Motors Ac-
ceptance Corp., 280 S.E.2d 703, 704 (W. Va. 1981)).
161 Aikens was submitted to the court on June 7, 2000, and decided on November 6, 2000. The
brief of plaintiff/appellant Eastern Steel had been filed with the Court Clerk on October 11, 2000,
which is 26 days before Aikens was decided.
162 549 S.E. 2d 266 (W. Va. 2001).
163 See id. at 269.
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system, including the design of a new sewage treatment plant to be built under
one construction contract, and the design of two sewer lines to the new plant to
be built under two additional construction contracts.' 64 Kanakanui prepared
plans and specifications to be used in soliciting bids from construction compa-
nies and to be further used by the successful bidders in constructing the pro-
ject. 165 The plaintiff, Eastern Steel Constructors, Inc., ("Eastern") was awarded
a contract to build one of the sewer lines to the new plant.
166
After beginning construction on the sewer line, Eastern experienced sig-
nificant delays allegedly caused by sub-surface rock conditions and existing
utility lines that had not been disclosed in the documents prepared by Kana-
kanui. 167 Kanakanui responded by contending that under the contract between
Eastern and Salem, Eastern was responsible for construction "regardless of the
type, nature, or quantity of sub-surface conditions.' ' 68 In any event, Eastern
claimed it incurred substantial financial damages resulting from delays and al-
legedly improper management by Kanakanui.1
69
Eastern subsequently filed tort actions against both Salem and Kana-
kanui for negligence and breach of implied warranty of the plans and specifica-
tions.170 Alternatively, Eastern also argued that it was entitled to damages as a
third party beneficiary of the contract between Salem and Kanakanui.' 7' Kana-
kanui responded by filing a motion for summary judgment, which was granted
by the Circuit Court of Harrison County. 172 The circuit court concluded that
under West Virginia law, "there is not a duty owed by the engineer/architect to
the building contractor" regarding the adequacy of the plans created for the con-
struction project. 173 Furthermore, any action for recovery by the building con-
tractor was limited to a breach of contract action. 174 Since Eastern was not in
privity of contract with Kanakanui, Eastern was limited to suit against Salem. 
175
Reviewing the circuit court's grant of summary judgment de novo, the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals applied the analysis set forth in Aikens
164 See id. at 268-69.
165 See id. at 269.
166 See id.
167 See id.
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and concluded that a design professional does owe a duty of care to a contractor
who is working on the same project and therefore the contractor may bring a tort
action against the design professional for negligence and recover purely eco-
nomic losses. 1
76
Beginning with the principle that privity of contract is not a necessary
prerequisite for a negligence action in the context of the construction industry,
177
the court proceeded to analyze the question of whether a design professional
owes a duty of care to a contractor notwithstanding the absence of a contractual
relationship. Building on the Aikens decision and taking note of several other
jurisdictions that have examined this issue, 78 the court expressly held:
A design professional (e.g. an architect or engineer) owes a duty
of care to a contractor who has been employed by the same pro-
ject owner as the design professional and who has relied upon
the design professional's work product in carrying out his or her
obligations to the owner, notwithstanding the absence of privity
of contract between the contractor and the design professional,
due to the special relationship that exists between the two.
Consequently, the contractor may, upon proper proof, recover
purely economic damages in an action alleging professional
negligence on the part of the design professional.
79
This expanded duty of care is a product of the special relationship cre-
ated when the two parties are both hired to work on the same construction pro-
ject. "[T]he contractor must rely on design documents to calculate a bid, and if
successful in bidding, to construct the project, and may be further subject to
oversight by the design professional during actual construction of the pro-
ject.,' 180 This clearly foreseeable, if not required, reliance by a contractor is a
key factor in imposing a legal duty on the part of the designer to use the proper
level of care in the preparation of the plans.' 8' In other words, a contractor is in
176 See id. at 275. The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment as to the third-party
beneficiary claim explaining that under W. Va. Code § 55-8-12, "a person who is not a party to a
contract can maintain a cause of action arising from that contract only if it was made for his or her
,sole benefit."' Id. at 277. "While it is clear that the contracting parties knew the contract would
result in professional work product by Kanakanui that would ultimately be relied upon by a con-
struction contractor building the project, it is equally clear that the contract itself was for the bene-
fit of the contracting parties." Id. at 278 (emphasis in original).
177 Id. at 270.
178 See id. at 272; see also Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Jordon, Jones &
Goulding, Inc., 463 S.E.2d 85, 87 n.1 (S.C. 1995).
179 E. Steel Constructors, 549 S.E.2d at 275 (emphasis added).
180 Id.
'8' See Aikens v. Debow, 541 S.E.2d 576, 589 (W. Va. 2000) (discussing the existence of a
special relationship: "It may be evident from the defendant's knowledge or specific reason to
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a special situation. It would seem unfair not to allow the contractor to recover
its losses caused by the negligence of a design professional when the contractor
has no choice but to rely on the plans provided. 82 The contractor's bid is based
on these plans and the construction must be performed accordingly.' 83 Substan-
tial errors in the plans may result in unanticipated delays or require significant
additional work, not accounted for in the bid calculation.184 The result could be
serious financial loss to the contractor.
Since a duty exists, its parameters must be defined. Generally speaking,
the scope of any professional's duty is to render "professional services with the
ordinary skill, care and diligence commensurate with that rendered by members
of [the] profession in the same or similar circumstances.' ' 85 This duty may fur-
ther be defined on a case-by-case basis or through reference to the professional
rules of conduct promulgated by the proper agency overseeing the specific pro-
fession of which a defendant is a member.'
86
Accordingly, the court found that a design professional owes a duty of
care to a contractor to perform its services with the appropriate level of care,
notwithstanding the lack of privity of contract between the parties.1 87 Thus, a
design professional is potentially liable to the contractor for economic damages
proximately caused by a breach of that duty of care. The court also held that a
design professional "impliedly warrants to the contractor" 88 that the plans and
specifications "have been prepared with the ordinary skill, care and diligence
commensurate with that rendered by members of [the] profession."'' 89 There-
fore, where a contractor has suffered economic loss due to negligence in the
preparation of plans and specifications by a design professional, the contractor
may not only have a cause of action sounding in tort, but also in implied war-
ranty as well. 90
West Virginia jurisprudence now has its first example, under the new
analysis, of when a special relationship exists between parties that will persuade
the court to allow tort recovery for purely economic losses. But where will the
next "sufficiently close nexus" be found? Aikens offers a number of past exam-
know of the potential consequences of the wrongdoing, the persons likely to be injured, and the
damages likely to be suffered.").
182 E. Steel Constructors, 549 S.E.2d at 275.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 268, Syl. Pt. 7.
186 See id. at 275.
187 See id.
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pies of special relationship exceptions in West Virginia before the economic
loss rule was formerly buried. These include holding accountants liable to third
parties for the negligent preparation of financial reports even in the absence of
privity of contract.' 9' Surveyors 192 and termite inspectors' 93 have been responsi-
ble to remote purchasers of homes for negligent performance of professional
services. Also, attorneys 94 and notaries public 95 have been liable when their
negligence causes injury to a third party.
Possible areas of future special relationships can also be found in other
jurisdictions. For instance, California has imposed a duty on behalf of contrac-
tors performing work on a building to complete construction in a timely manner
to avoid economic losses to a tenant of the building. 96 If the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals is willing to treat the special relationship analysis
expansively, it could follow the lead of New Jersey where a chemical manufac-
turer was held liable for purely economic damages when a chemical leak com-
pelled the evacuation of neighboring businesses, leading to lost revenues and
other expenses. 97 With the significant presence of chemical companies in the
Kanawha Valley, this example of a special relationship could prove very signifi-
cant if the court is willing to apply this new standard liberally.
Expansive interpretation of the special relationship analysis could lead
to a wide range of relationships being dubbed "special." The complex and intri-
cate nature of our commercial world could present a number of intimate work-
ing relationships that could possibly satisfy the close nexus requirement. Al-
though the court previously declined to offer specific examples of possible new
special relationships,' 98 the expansion of liability for purely economic losses
will likely have the greatest impact on the professional services industry. Pro-
fessionals who provide services that have clear ramifications beyond the imme-
191 See First Natil. Bank of Bluefield v. Crawford, 386 S.E.2d 310 (W. Va. 1989); H. Rosen-
blum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 522 (1977).
192 See Capper v. Gates, 454 S.E.2d 54 (W. Va. 1994); see also Rozny v. Marnul, 250 N.E.2d
656 (Ill. 1969).
193 See Stemple v. Dobson, 400 S.E.2d 561 (W. Va. 1990); see also Hardy v. Carmichael, 24
Cal. Rptr. 475 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962).
194 See Keister v. Talbott, 391 S.E.2d 895 (W. Va. 1990); see also Heyer v. Flaig, 449 P.2d 161
(Cal. 1969) (attorney held liable for failing to inform plaintiff-beneficiary's mother of the testa-
mentary consequences of a planned remarriage, reducing beneficiary's share of estate); Lucas v.
Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961).
195 See Galloway v. Cinello, 423 S.E.2d 875 (W. Va. 1992) (citing W.Va. Code § 29C-6-101
(1999)); Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1979).
196 See J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60 (Cal. 1979).
197 See People Express Airlines Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107 (N.J. 1985).
198 "Any attempt ... to more specifically define the parameters of circumstances which may be
held to establish a 'special relationship' would create more confusion than clarity." Aikens v.
Debow, 541 S.E.2d 576, 590 (W. Va. 2000).
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diate client will be particularly susceptible to claims for liability arising out of
negligent performance of those servicese - especially when the professional has
special knowledge of the possible consequences to particular third parties.
Distribution networks could present a possible source of special rela-
tionships. While no long-term contractual obligations may be involved, retailers
depend on distributors, who depend on manufacturers, who depend on suppliers
for product availability. Disputes could arise between these parties over eco-
nomic losses caused by an unavailable product. Depending on the closeness of
the relationship, one may owe a legal duty to another to ensure a supply. How-
ever, the imposition of liability in this setting should be very limited. Purchas-
ers are usually free to seek products from any supplier in the market and simi-
larly sellers can sell to almost anyone willing to buy. The choice of one party to
rely on the other for future business relations should not be sufficient to create
the close nexus required for a special relationship. Neither should a lengthy
course of dealing suffice since either party would be free to discontinue the rela-
tionship without notice. Only when a party is in some manner compelled, out-
side of any contractual relationship, to rely on the adequate performance of the
other should a special relationship possibly come into being.
Unless the court takes a very narrow view of the special relationship
analysis, the holding of Aikens is unlikely to remain confined to the contractor-
architect example provided by Eastern Steel. These two cases were decided
almost within three months' 99 of each other with Aikens setting the stage by
abandoning the economic loss rule in favor of the special relationship analysis.
Aikens could have easily been decided by applying the traditional rule.2 °° In-
stead, while effectively denying recovery to that plaintiff, the court conducted
an extensive review of the history, purpose, and policy behind the economic loss
rule and determined that it should be replaced by the more flexible special rela-
tionship analysis. Additionally, Eastern Steel could have been decided without
the foundation of Aikens by simply creating another exception to the traditional
rule and support the exception by citing the numerous jurisdictions that permit a
specific cause of action in tort for contractors against designers. 20 1 The detailed
analysis provided in Aikens, even when the court effectively denied recovery,
and the relative ease with which Eastern Steel could have been decided without
the Aikens precedent, stand as strong evidence that the examples of special rela-
tionships in West Virginia are likely to go beyond the construction industry set-
ting.
199 Aikens was decided on November 6, 2000, and Eastern Steel was decided on February 9,
2001.
200 Since the defendant did not owe a duty to Aikens to avoid causing purely economic injury,
the court simply could have dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted. See W. VA. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
201 See Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Jordon, Jones & Goulding, Inc., 463
S.E.2d 85, 87 n.1 (S.C. 1995).
2002]
29
Stonestreet: Replacing a Solid Wall with a Chain-Link Fence: Special Relations
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2002
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
The court is clearly cognizant of the potential consequences of an overly
broad interpretation of this analysis and expressed its concern on this matter:
"There would be no bounds to actions and litigious intricacies, if the ill effects
of the negligences of men could be followed down the chain of results to the
final effect., 20 2 Thus, the application of this analysis should be approached with
caution to avoid realization of the traditional fears surrounding a "limitless ex-
pansion of duty. 203
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP ANALYSIS IN THE
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
While each profession or industry will likely have its own unique com-
plications with the special relationship analysis, expansion of liability into the
construction industry may have the most unique complications. Providing con-
tractors with a direct cause of action against a designer for negligence, whether
in the preparation of plans or supervision of the project, may interfere with con-
tractual negotiations in the industry. This could lead to increased construction
costs and a possible conflict of interest for design professionals. However, these
potential difficulties, which may not come to pass, do not justify allowing de-
signers to act with impunity toward contractors when performing professional
services. Contractors should have a mode of legal recourse when financially
injured by the negligence of a design professional.
A. Distribution of Risk and Contractual Negotiations
One criticism of this expansion of tort law is that it represents an un-
needed invasion into the realm of contract law. 2°4 "The controlling policy un-
derlying tort law is... the protection of persons and property from losses result-
ing from injury. The controlling policy underlying the law of contracts is the
protection of expectations bargained for. 20 5 The issue arising in disputes be-
tween contractors and designers is fundamentally "one of dividing risks and
responsibilities among the participants in a commercial transaction according to
their intentions, rather than one of protecting person and property (including,,. 206
profits) from injury with rules that promote .safety and reasonable conduct.
Since loss of bargained for expectation (profit) or standard of quality are issues
of party expectation, they should accordingly be governed by the rules of con-
202 Aikens, 541 S.E.2d at 585 (quoting Kahl v. Love, 37 N.J.L. 5 (1874)).
203 Id. at 581.
204 Matthew S. Steffey, Negligence, Contract, and Architects' Liability for Economic Loss, 82
Ky. L.J. 659 (1994).
205 Id. at 681 (quoting Sensenbrenner v. Rust, Orling, & Neale, 374 S.E.2d 55, 58 (Va. 1988)).
206 Id. at 680 (quoting Anderson Elec., Inc. v. Ledbetter Erection Corp., 503 N.E.2d 246, 251
(Ill. 1987) (Simon, J., specially concurring)).
[Vol. 105
30
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 105, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 8
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol105/iss1/8
ABANDONING THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE
tract law. "Protections against economic losses caused by another's failure
properly to perform is but one provision the contractor may require in striking
,,207his bargain.
However, one problem with relying on contractual negotiations is that a
contractor is not in any type of privity with the designer to negotiate this risk.2 °8
The contractual relationships run between the owner and the designer and also
between the owner and the contractor.20 9 The contractor has no ability to nego-
tiate with the designer, who has no obligation to negotiate with the contractor.
Therefore, there is no opportunity to divide the risks and responsibilities be-
tween the contractor and designer according to their intentions. Despite this
inability, the contractor is forced to rely on the designer for almost every aspect
of the project. "[T]he contractor must rely on design documents to calculate his
or her bid and, if successful in bidding, to construct the project, and may be fur-
ther subject to oversight by the design professional during actual construction of
the project.' 21 0 This required reliance by the contractor on the accuracy of the
designer's specifications is a key factor in imposing a duty upon the designer to
use the proper level of care in preparing the plans.2 ' Since the contractor has no
choice but to base its bid on the plans, it is clearly foreseeable that errors in the
plans may negatively impact the contractor.212 Again, the concept of duty in tort
liability is not based on whether contractual negotiations are available; it is
based on foreseeability.213
Another criticism of the introduction of tort law into this area of the
construction industry concerns potential inflation of the costs of construction.
214
The allocation of risk in construction projects is a factor in determining the fees
charged by the parties involved. "The fees charged by architects, engineers,
contractors, developers, vendors, and so on are founded on their expected liabil-
ity exposure as bargained and provided for in the contract., 2" This potential
threat of litigation interferes with the allocation of risk through the contracting
process by adding uncertainty of liability to the mix of factors. If a designer
cannot properly estimate its potential liability with respect to the contractual
207 Id. at 681.
208 See Michael T. Terwilliger, Economic Loss in the Construction Context: Should Architects
Be Liable for the Commercial Expectations of Contractors?, 31 VAL. U. L. REv. 257, 262 (1996).
209 See id.
210 E. Steel Constructors v. City of Salem, 549 S.E.2d 266, 275 (W. Va. 2001).
211 See Aikens v. Debow, 541 S.E.2d 576, 589 (W. Va. 2000); see also E. Steel Constructors,
549 S.E.2d at 275.
212 E. Steel Constructors, 549 S.E.2d at 275.
213 See Syl. Pt. 3, Sewell, 371 S.E.2d at 83; SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 3, at 398.
214 E. Steel Constructors, 549 S.E.2d at 278. (Maynard, J., dissenting).
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provisions, the fee charged will likely have to be increased to insure against
possible liability to a contractor. Also, the availability of a lawsuit may discour-
age a contractor from "going the extra mile" to minimize delay damages if it can
simply hold the architect liable for the delay.21 6 This additional potential liabil-
ity increases the net cost of the designer's services and thus increases the net
cost of the entire project.1 7
On the other hand, although this new legal liability creates some uncer-
tainty for the designers, it correspondingly relieves some uncertainty on behalf
of contractors. If a contractor cannot rely on the accuracy of a designer's speci-
fications, it cannot accurately calculate a bid. Also, if a designer has no legal
obligation toward a contractor, the designer has less incentive to refrain from
conduct that could cause economic injury to a contractor. Since a contractor is
not a party to the contractual negotiations between the owner and the designer, it
has no opportunity to negotiate this risk.1 8 Just as the fees charged by designers
are based on expected exposure, so are the fees charged by contractors. Impos-
ing liability on designers for negligence alleviates the uncertainty that the con-
tractors face, which should result in lower contractor fees.
In regard to delay damages, contractors will still have adequate incen-
tive to minimize delay: the desire to maximize profit. Delays are an unavoid-
able reality in construction and contractors do anticipate them. 219 When delay
can be avoided, or at least minimized, a contractor's profit will increase. Addi-
tionally, designers can only be held responsible for delays when they result from
negligent conduct and recovery by a contractor will require litigation and time,
which both cost money. Unless the economic injury is significant, a contrac-
tor's desire to maximize profit will provide ample incentive to minimize delay.
B. A Superficial Conflict of Interest
Another potential problem arising from this new expansion of liability
concerns the triangular relationship between the project owner, the designer, and
the contractor.220 The traditional delivery system of construction contracts in-
volves a project owner hiring a designer to draft plans for the project.22 The
owner then solicits bids from prospective contractors to complete the project.222
These bids submitted are based on the plans prepared by the designer.223 This
216 See Steffey, supra note 204, at 685.
217 See id.
218 See Terwilliger, supra note 208, at 262.
219 See Steffey, supra note 204, at 688.
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setting is designed to create an adversarial relationship between the designer, as
the owner's agent, and the contractor.224 The owner wants no privity between
the architect and the contractor so the owner can receive the lowest possible
price through competitive bidding among prospective contractors.225 Also, the
designer supervises the project on behalf of the owner to insure the contractor
does not overcharge the owner or deviate from the contract documents in con-
structing the project.226 The designer's interest in the quality of the contractor's
materials and workmanship, as an agent of the owner, is in conflict with the
contractor's interest in maximizing its profit.
2 27
Eliminating the economic loss rule's barrier to recovery in this context
could potentially jeopardize this adversarial relationship and the owner's interest
in maximizing its benefits.
If courts do not apply the economic loss doctrine in the tradi-
tional delivery system, all [designers], negligent and non-
negligent, will be forced to consider the commercial expecta-
tions of contractors. The effect on non-negligent [designers] is
that, even though the plans and specifications are prepared
without breaching the professional standard of care, they might
consider the commercial expectations of the contractor more
important than those of the owner.228
A threat of litigation from both the owner and contractor could com-
promise the contractual duties owed to the owner by forcing the designer to con-
sider potential litigation from both the owner and the contractor when making
decisions. 229 This may create a conflict of interest between the designer's duty
to the owner to ensure quality work and its interest in avoiding a suit from a
contractor.23°
For example, in approving a newly developed building material for use,
if the designer approves without proper testing, the material could be inadequate
and the designer would have breached its duty to the owner to ensure quality
materials.23' On the other hand, if the designer insists upon testing the material
before approval, this could lead to significant delays in construction, which may
224 Terwilliger, supra note 208, at 263.
225 See id.
226 Id.




231 This example is similar to that provided in Terwilliger, supra note 208, at 303.
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cause economic damage to the contractor who now has a potential suit against
the designer.232 Even if requiring the testing is not a breach of the designer's
duty of care to the contractor, a concern over a possible lawsuit from a contrac-
tor may influence the designer's decision, thus compromising the designer's
duty to the owner to ensure quality materials.
This conflict of interest concern is likely to prove unfounded. Although
imposing a duty of care on behalf of a designer toward a contractor does compel
the designer to be cognizant of the contractor's interests, it does not necessarily
create a conflict of interest for the designer. This duty does not increase the
level of care required by the designer. The duty of care is only extended to con-
tractors who must rely on the plans for bidding purposes and actual construc-
tion. Imposing a duty on behalf of the designer to competently perform its pro-
fession does not require it to serve two masters.
A designer's inability to completely ignore the financial interests of a
contractor does not create a conflict of interest for the designer. The designer is
still only required to exercise the appropriate level of care in the performance of
its profession, which any responsible professional should do in a commercial
setting, especially in a setting where there will be clear reliance by others on the
adequacy of the professional's work. Any conflict of interest is superficial.
Despite the concerns over expanding tort liability into the construction
setting, imposing a duty to contractors on behalf of a design professional to per-
form professional services with the proper level of skill is appropriate in light of
the special relationship between the designer and the contractor.233 The law
should impose a duty of care in situations where there will be clearly foresee-
able, if not required, reliance by one party on the quality of another party's
work.234 This duty is especially important when the relying party has no oppor-
tunity to "shop around" or contractually negotiate with the party providing the
services. The risk of designer negligence has been properly allocated to the
party who is in the best position to guard against the negligence. 235 This re-
allocation of risk may require an increase in the fee charged by the former, but
may decrease the fee charged by the latter. Additionally, any potential conflict
of interest for the designer proves to be superficial since the duty of care on be-
half of the designer has not been elevated; it has merely been extended. An in-
ability to completely disregard the interests of other parties involved on a project
should not jeopardize the designer's relationship with the project owner. It re-
quires the designer to simply be cognizant of the potential consequences of its
carelessness and perform its professional duties in a competent fashion.
232 See id. at 258-59.
233 See Syl Pt. 6, E. Steel Constructors v. City of Salem, 549 S.E.2d 266, 268 (W. Va. 2001).
234 Syl. Pt. 9, Aikens v. Debow, 541 S.E.2d 576, 579 (W. Va. 2000).
235 E. Steel Constructors, 549 S.E.2d at 275.
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V. CONCLUSION
The adoption of the special relationship analysis to allow recovery of
purely economic losses in limited circumstances is both a bold and appropriate
step forward for West Virginia. Since innocent plaintiffs are just as susceptible
to purely economic injuries as they are to physical ones,236 replacing the tradi-
tional economic loss rule with a more flexible, elastic approach will allow re-
covery of economic damages for meritorious claims. When the consequences of
a defendant's carelessness are clearly foreseeable, because of the special cir-
cumstances or relationships involved, liability for purely economic damages is
appropriate.
Additionally, recovery can be permitted while simultaneously guarding
against the traditional concerns over recovery of purely economic losses. Al-
lowing liability to attach only in special situations will prevent potential liability
from becoming too burdensome. It will preclude the potentially countless
claims for economic losses that may arise from every interruption of commerce.
Our poor soul who crashed in the tunnel will not be subjected to liability for all
the consequences of his carelessness. This new analysis would not apply since
no close nexus existed between him and all the delayed motorists. Neither
would our hypothetical ABC Retailer be able to recover its economic damages
because no special relationship existed between it and the motorist who crashed
near its store. The line demarcating the limits of legal redress for injury is still
present, but the location, or the nature, of the line has been altered.
This new line will require maintenance to function properly. The proper
balance must be struck and the court is fully aware of its role in reflecting public
policy to avoid "socially and economically ruinous ' 237 liability. This expansion
of liability into the realm of purely economic losses must be kept in check lest
we fall victim to the fear of "liability in an indeterminate amount for an inde-
terminate time to an indeterminate class, 238 and I believe our judicial system is
well suited for the task.
Robert M. Stonestreet*
236 People Express Airlines Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 111 (N.J. 1985).
237 Aikens, 541 S.E.2d at 583.
238 Ultramares v. Touch, 174 N.E. 441,444 (N.Y. 1931).
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